Military Regime in Brazil

Military Regime in Brazil (1964 - 1985 )

The military regime introduced new domestic political restrictions. In the security sphere, disarmament was defended and the joint control system of the two superpowers condemned. Brazil was particularly judgmental of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (TNP), with a view to guarantee the right to develop its own nuclear technology.

This prerogative had already been defended previously, when the Brazilian government decided not to accept the validity of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Brazil's position as to the TNP became emblematic of the negative posture that it would, from then onwards, sustain regarding the power politics of the United States and the Soviet Union.

general Figueiredo and Chief of SNI

Simultaneously, Brazil tried to strengthen its position with nuclear cooperation negotiated settlements with countries such as: Israel, (1966), France (1967), India (1968) and the United States (1972).

With the third military government (1969-74), led by general Garrastazu Médici, Brazil's international policy intensified the transformation process, guided by directives already adopted in the previous period. Nevertheless, as the domestic context witnessed increased political hardening, the scope of the country's foreign influence was restricted

The decreeing of Institutional Act # 5 (1968) marked a new phase of restrictions in the country's political freedom. The succession of kidnappings of foreign ambassadors in Brazil created embarrassments for the military government. The anti-government manifestations and the action of guerilla movements generated an increase in repressive measures. In this scenario, the "ideological frontiers" of Brazilian foreign policy were reinforced.

The US Army School of Americas (SOA), based in Fort Benning, Georgia, trains Latin American soldiers in combat, counter-insurgency, and counter-narcotics. Graduates of the SOA are responsible for some of the worst human rights abuses in Latin America.

Among the SOA's nearly 60,000 graduates are notorious dictators Manuel Noriega and Omar Torrijos of Panama, Leopoldo Galtieri and Roberto Viola of Argentina, Juan Velasco Alvarado of Peru, Guillermo Rodriguez of Ecuador, and Hugo Banzer of Bolivia.

Lower-level SOA graduates have participated in human rights abuses that include the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero and the El Mozote Massacre of 900 civilians.

At the same time, the results of the economic policy consolidated the option for the national-development model. Thanks to these results, the country’s foreign economic connections were transformed, allowing the its international presence to be broadened.

In the Middle East, there was a greater attunement of Brazil with the Arab nations. At this time, Brazilian diplomacy began to support the demands of the Arab League in the Arab-Israel conflict.

Brazil and CIA

(CounterSpy, April - May 1979, pp. 4-23) by Peter Gribbin

In the fall of 1961, just as Joao Goulart was assuming the presidency, the United States began to make contact with his right-wing opposition. At the same time, the CIA began a multifaceted penetration of Brazilian society designed to influence that country's internal politics. Lincoln Gordon, U.S. ambassador to Brazil, was appointed the same day that Goulart's predecessor, Janio Quadros resigned. Soon after his arrival in October, Gordon met with a right-wing admiral named Silvio Heck. Heck informed Gordon of a poll of the armed services which revealed that over two-thirds of the enlisted men opposed Goulart. Heck also hoped that when it came time to oust Goulart "the U.S would take an understanding view." Although Gordon later determined that Heck's figures were exaggerated, he never once warned Goulart or his advisers of this conspiracy.

The CIA, for its part, took more than a passive interest in helping right-wing military forces come to power in Brazil. The overthrow of Goulart and the destruction of democracy in Brazil was effected through the manipulation of diverse social groups. Police, the military, political parties, labor unions, student federations and housewives associations were all exploited in the interest of stirring up opposition to Goulart.

Yet, while Washington's original intent may have been to replace Goulart with the strongman General Castello Branco, the guaranty of the coup's longterm success demanded an increase in U.S. material and training for the Brazilian security forces which continues to this day.